This Hazards Evaluation also evaluates the controls currently assigned to the spray leak in structure accident and determines the applicability of the controls to the new hazardous conditions. This comparison reviews both the analysis in the FSAR and the controls found in the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) (CHG, 2000h) . If the new hazardous conditions do not match the analyzed accident conditions and controls, then additional analysis may be required.
This document is not intended to authorize the activity or determine the adequacy of controls; it is only intended to provide information about the hazardous conditions associated with this activity. The Control decision process as defined in the AB will be used to determine the adequacy of controls and whether the proposed activity is within the AB. This hazard evaluation does not constitute an accident analysis.
BACKGROUND
Pressurized spray releases are a safety concern because they can be an efficient generator of respirable aerosols. Pressurized spray releases inside actively ventilated waste tanks could result from improperly installed pumps or from small holes or cracks in the piping. A spray leak in an actively ventilated tank could generate enough aerosol to load up the HEPA filters with particulate or moisture. If the filters fail, aerosols from the tank are released through an unfiltered pathway and dispersed through the vent stack.
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DESCRIPTION
The following are potential sources of in-tank spray leaks:
Normal Transfers from DCRTs, SSTs, DSTs, and AWF Tanks: Submersible centrifugal pumps retrieve waste from the tanks. Raising the liquid to the surface by vacuum is not a viable technique due the specific gravity of the fluid and the depth of the liquid below the surface. Thus, the piping from the pump to where it exits the tank is under pressure. A spray leak could develop because of a failed pipe or pipe connection. The connection from the pump discharge to the pipe would normally be submerged and any leaks would not produce a spray.
Salt Well Pumping: Jet pump systems are used for Salt Well Pumping (SWP). The complete salt well system consists of a jet pump and a salt well casing with a stainless steel salt well screen welded to a Schedule 40 carbon steel pipe. There are 24 screen openings (slots) that are approximately 1.27 mm (0.050 in.) wide. The screen is inserted into the tank riser located in the pump pit and extends to near the tank bottom. The transfer piping is located inside the salt well casing and screen. Two pressurized pipes are required to operate the salt well jet pump: one flowing out of the tank and a return flow line. Once the salt well jet pump system is primed and operating, the jet forces liquid to a centrifugal pump in the pump pit. Most of the flow is re-circulated back to the jet, however, only the waste flowing through the salt cake to the pump is injected into the transfer lines. Thus the total flow in the lines to and from the tank can be significantly larger than the flow into the transfer lines.
Transfer of Waste Into A Tank: Normal transfer of liquids or slurries into the tank has the potential of pressurizing the inlet pipe extending into the dome space. The vapor created by the inlet flow is not considered a spray leak, but the result of a planned activity. This section of pipe is relatively short and under normal conditions the pressure in this section of pipe is low. A spray leak would be the result of a blockage in the discharge piping causing a spray through a crack or joint into the dome space.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
The hazards identification and evaluation of in-tank spray leaks used the Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) method. The PHA consisted of a systematic brainstorming process which included the following:
Identifying potential methods of producing an in-tank spray leak and other variables that could affect in-tank spray leak hazards,
Postulating hazards associated with in-tank spray leaks,
Estimating the frequencies and consequences of the hazardous conditions, and
Identifying the possible mitigative and preventive measures for each postulated hazardous condition. recognizes the PHA process as a creditable method of hazard evaluation. AIChE (1992) describes this process in their publication, "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures." A multi-disciplinary team records the results of this brainstorming process using a tabular format. The depth of the PHA is directly related to the experience and knowledge of the participants. A short resume of each team member is included in Appendix A to document the experience and knowledge of the PHA team.
METHODOLOGY
The PHA team met to develop the raw data. The information was recorded systematically in tabular format. The following sections describe the PHA table structure and details for recording information. The PHA was structured to ensure a systematic and thorough evaluation of the potential hazards. The PHA captured the following information:
Item ID: The item identification (ID); used to record a unique identifier for the hazardous condition.
Location/Activity: Specific point in the system or process where the deviation from the desired condition of a process variable is evaluated.
Hazardous Condition: The hardware failures, operational faults, or conditions that could result in undesired consequences during waste transfer activities.
. This column identifies the sequence of hardware and operational faults required to produce the postulated hazardous condition.
Material at Risk:
The material which could be released in an associated accident.
Immediate Consequence: The potential consequences that could result from the postulated hazardous condition.
Engineered Safety Features:
Existing engineered features (hardware items) identified by the PHA team that have the potential to mitigate or prevent the hazardous condition of concern. The engineered features are candidates for designation as Safety-Significant items for hazardous conditions that pose a significant threat to the health of facility workers and onsite personnel or Safety-Class for hazards that pose a significant threat to offsite individuals. These items should not be construed as being the "official" controls that would eventually be credited in the AB.
Administrative Safety Features:
Technical Safety Requirements and other existing controls identified by the PHA team that have the potential to mitigate or prevent the hazardous condition of concern. These items should not be construed as being the "official" administrative features that would eventually be credited in the AB.
Consequence Category No Controls (Con Cat NC):
The consequence ranking is a "first cut," qualitative estimate of the safety severity of the consequences assuming no controls are present. The following system is used: so s1
Negligible safety concerns for the facility worker.
Potential industrial injury, low radiological or chemical exposure dose consequences to the facility worker.
Potential significant radiological dose consequences or chemical exposure to onsite workers located outside the facility.
Potential significant radiological dose consequences or chemical exposure to the offsite population. 
F3
Events that are expected to occur one or more times during the lifetime of the facility, categorized as "anticipated" events. The frequency range associated with this category is less than lE-O2/yr.
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F2
Events that could occur during the lifetime of the facility, but with low probability. Such events are categorized as "unlikely" and fall in the range of lE-O4/yr to lE-O2/yr.
Events not expected to occur during the lifetime of the facility, categorized as "extremely unlikely." The frequency range associated with this category is lE-O6/yr to lE-O4/yr.
Events categorized as "beyond extremely unlikely," with a frequency less than lE-O6/yr. Events in this category (such as a meteor strike) are so unlikely they generally do not require special controls.
Environmental Category (Env Cat):
The environmental consequence ranking is a "first cut," qualitative estimate of the environmental severity of the hazardous condition assuming no controls are present. The following system is used: Limited environmental discharge of hazardous material outside the facility.
Large environmental discharge of hazardous material within the plant site boundary.
Significant environmental discharges of hazardous material outside the plant site boundary.
E l E2 E3
Remarks: Miscellaneous observations or clarifying comments for a given item.
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
There was only one assumption developed, namely that a failure of pressurized transfer systems in the tank dome space would produce a spray that creates respirable aerosols.
EVALUATION
Eight hazardous conditions were identified by the PHA team during the team deliberations; these are presented in (FFS, 2000) . The calculated releases for in tank spray leaks
show that the offsite and onsite consequences are well below guidelines. Therefore, the consequences for the hazards associated with the in-tank spray leaks may be reduced from S3 and S2 to S1. This is documented in Table 3 -3. There are numerous hazardous conditions found in the Hazard Database associated with spray leaks in general and with breaches of containment due to HEPA filter failure. None of these hazards specifically address in-tank spray leaks. However, the hazardous conditions identified for spray leaks in structures and waste transfer lines are closely related to the in-tank spray leak hazards identified in this PHA. For that reason, the in-tank spray leak hazards can be related directly to the accident associated with the existing spray leak hazards, namely the "Spray Leak in Structure From Waste Transfer Lines" accident [Representative Accident (Rep Acc) 151. 
BIN:
A code that describes the release attributes for high Safety Consequences (S2 or S3) and Worker (S 1) with anticipated frequency (F3) hazardous conditions.
Cause Grp: Cause Group -An alphdnumeric code used to permit sorting of data by the cause of the hazardous conditions.
Rep Acc: Representative Accident -An alphdnumeric code used to specify the analyzed accident in the FSAR. Only hazardous conditions with high Safety Consequence (S2 or S3) are assigned as representative accidents. Table 3 -6 lists potential preventive and mitigative structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) controls specific to actively ventilated tanks that address the five identified hazardous conditions. This table lists the Item ID, MAR, Hazardous Condition, Cause, Potential Preventive SSCs, Potential Mitigative SSCs, Potential Preventive TSRs, Potential Mitigative TSRs, Remarks, and Consequence Category. The control for actively ventilated tanks is the ventilation stack continuous air monitor (CAM) interlock with permanent or temporary ventilation systems. This control is a limiting condition for operation (LCO) and is described in Section 3.1.4 in "Tank Waste Remediation System Technical Safety Requirements" (CHG, 2000b) . LCO 3.1.4 provides assurance that the interlock operates during transfers in and out of actively ventilated tanks and during transfers through routes physically connected to actively ventilated tanks. The CAM interlock system is considered a Safety Class SSC. Administrative Control (AC) 5.12, Transfer Controls, addresses the five hazards caused by the mistransfer of waste which then results in a pressurized transfer line. AC 5.12 requires independent verification of the transfer route to assure the following: the waste is transferred through the proper route, the piping is in place per configuration status controls, correct and OPERABLE pumps are specified, and valves are properly aligned prior to transfer. 
